package security

import (
	"context"
	"errors"
	"fmt"
	"strings"
	"testing"
	"time"

	"velox-bot/internal/db/repos/securityrepo"

	"github.com/bwmarrin/discordgo"
)

var ctx = context.Background()

// testEngine is a guild (id 100) owned by user 1, with Velox as user 999,
// alerts going to channel 500 and pinging role 201.
func testEngine(t *testing.T) (*Engine, *fakeDiscord, *fakeStore, *time.Time) {
	t.Helper()
	d, st := newDiscord(), newStore()
	e := New(d, st, "999")
	e.syncDMs = true
	now := time.Date(2026, 10, 20, 12, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
	e.now = func() time.Time { return now }
	s := st.set(100)
	s.AlertChannelID, s.AlertRoleID = 500, 201
	return e, d, st, &now
}

func refresh(e *Engine) { e.Invalidate(guild) }

// snowflake for an account created at t.
func snowflakeAt(t time.Time, n int) string {
	ms := t.UnixMilli() - 1420070400000
	return fmt.Sprint(ms<<22 | int64(n))
}

func entry(action discordgo.AuditLogAction, user, target string, changes ...*discordgo.AuditLogChange) *discordgo.AuditLogEntry {
	return &discordgo.AuditLogEntry{ActionType: &action, UserID: user, TargetID: target, Changes: changes}
}

func change(key discordgo.AuditLogChangeKey, old, new any) *discordgo.AuditLogChange {
	return &discordgo.AuditLogChange{Key: &key, OldValue: old, NewValue: new}
}

func contains(list []string, v string) bool {
	for _, x := range list {
		if x == v {
			return true
		}
	}
	return false
}

// ---- Join Gate ----

func TestCheckJoin(t *testing.T) {
	now := time.Date(2026, 10, 20, 12, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
	s := securityrepo.Defaults(1)
	s.JoinGateEnabled = true
	s.NoAvatar, s.NewAccount, s.AdvertisingName = securityrepo.ActionTimeout, securityrepo.ActionKick, securityrepo.ActionBan
	s.UsernameFilter, s.UsernamePatterns = securityrepo.ActionKick, []string{" FreeNitro "}
	s.UnverifiedBot = securityrepo.ActionKick

	old := snowflakeAt(now.AddDate(-1, 0, 0), 1)
	young := snowflakeAt(now.Add(-48*time.Hour), 2)

	for _, c := range []struct {
		name string
		u    *discordgo.User
		want string
	}{
		{"clean", &discordgo.User{ID: old, Username: "ana", Avatar: "x"}, "off"},
		{"no avatar", &discordgo.User{ID: old, Username: "ana"}, "timeout"},
		{"new account beats no avatar", &discordgo.User{ID: young, Username: "ana"}, "kick"},
		{"invite in display name", &discordgo.User{ID: old, Username: "ana", GlobalName: "join DISCORD.GG/abc", Avatar: "x"}, "ban"},
		{"blocked word, case-insensitive", &discordgo.User{ID: old, Username: "freenitro_giveaway", Avatar: "x"}, "kick"},
		{"verified bot passes", &discordgo.User{ID: young, Bot: true, PublicFlags: discordgo.UserFlagVerifiedBot}, "off"},
		{"unverified bot", &discordgo.User{ID: young, Bot: true}, "kick"},
	} {
		if got := CheckJoin(s, c.u, now).Action; got != c.want {
			t.Errorf("%s: got %s, want %s", c.name, got, c.want)
		}
	}
	s.JoinGateEnabled = false
	if CheckJoin(s, &discordgo.User{ID: young}, now).Action != "off" {
		t.Error("a disabled Join Gate must not act")
	}
}

func TestJoinGateAndJoinLock(t *testing.T) {
	e, d, st, now := testEngine(t)
	s := st.set(100)
	s.JoinGateEnabled, s.NewAccount = true, securityrepo.ActionKick
	refresh(e)

	young := d.addMember(snowflakeAt(now.Add(-time.Hour), 5))
	if removed := e.OnMemberJoin(ctx, guild, young); !removed || !contains(d.kicked, young.User.ID) {
		t.Errorf("new account should be kicked: removed=%v kicked=%v", removed, d.kicked)
	}
	if d.sentCount() != 1 || !contains(st.eventKinds(), securityrepo.EventJoinGate) {
		t.Error("the action should be alerted and recorded")
	}

	st.set(100).JoinLock = securityrepo.ActionBan
	refresh(e)
	m := d.addMember(snowflakeAt(now.AddDate(-2, 0, 0), 6))
	if !e.OnMemberJoin(ctx, guild, m) || !contains(d.banned, m.User.ID) {
		t.Error("a join lock bans everyone new")
	}
}

func TestOwnerAndBotAreNeverPunished(t *testing.T) {
	e, d, st, _ := testEngine(t)
	st.set(100).JoinLock = securityrepo.ActionBan
	refresh(e)
	if e.OnMemberJoin(ctx, guild, d.members["1"]) || len(d.banned) != 0 {
		t.Error("the owner must never be banned")
	}
	if err := e.Quarantine(ctx, guild, "1", "x"); err == nil {
		t.Error("the owner must never be quarantined")
	}
	if err := e.Quarantine(ctx, guild, "999", "x"); err == nil {
		t.Error("the bot must never quarantine itself")
	}
}

// ---- Raids ----

func TestRaidModeStartsActsAndEnds(t *testing.T) {
	e, d, st, now := testEngine(t)
	s := st.set(100)
	s.AntiRaidEnabled, s.RaidJoinCount, s.RaidJoinSeconds, s.RaidAction, s.RaidQuietMinutes = true, 3, 10, securityrepo.ActionKick, 5
	refresh(e)

	old := now.AddDate(-1, 0, 0)
	join := func(n int) *discordgo.Member {
		m := d.addMember(snowflakeAt(old, n))
		e.OnMemberJoin(ctx, guild, m)
		return m
	}
	a := join(1)
	*now = now.Add(2 * time.Second)
	join(2)
	if len(d.kicked) != 0 || e.RaidActive(guild) {
		t.Fatal("two joins are not a raid")
	}
	*now = now.Add(2 * time.Second)
	join(3)
	if !e.RaidActive(guild) || len(d.kicked) != 3 || !contains(d.kicked, a.User.ID) {
		t.Fatalf("the third join starts a raid and the whole burst is kicked: %v", d.kicked)
	}
	if len(d.requests) != 1 || !strings.Contains(d.requests[0], "/incident-actions") || !strings.Contains(d.requests[0], "2026-10-21") {
		t.Errorf("invites should be paused for 24h: %v", d.requests)
	}
	alert := d.channelSends()[0]
	if alert.Content != "<@&201>" || strings.Join(alert.AllowedMentions.Roles, ",") != "201" || len(alert.AllowedMentions.Users) != 0 {
		t.Errorf("a raid pings only the alert role: %+v", alert)
	}

	// During the raid every join is acted on.
	*now = now.Add(time.Minute)
	join(4)
	if len(d.kicked) != 4 {
		t.Errorf("joins during a raid are kicked: %v", d.kicked)
	}

	// Quiet for 5 minutes: it ends, invites resume, the list is posted.
	*now = now.Add(6 * time.Minute)
	e.checkRaids(ctx)
	if e.RaidActive(guild) {
		t.Fatal("the raid should end after the quiet period")
	}
	if len(d.requests) != 2 || !strings.Contains(d.requests[1], "invites_disabled_until:<nil>") {
		t.Errorf("invites should be resumed: %v", d.requests)
	}
	var list string
	for name, content := range d.files {
		if strings.HasPrefix(name, "raid-") {
			list = content
		}
	}
	if strings.Count(list, "\tkick\t") != 4 {
		t.Errorf("the summary should list the 4 kicked accounts:\n%s", list)
	}
	if err := e.EndRaid(ctx, guild, "1"); err == nil {
		t.Error("ending twice should say there's no raid")
	}
}

func TestNoAlertFloodDuringARaid(t *testing.T) {
	e, d, st, now := testEngine(t)
	s := st.set(100)
	s.JoinGateEnabled, s.NoAvatar = true, securityrepo.ActionKick
	s.AntiRaidEnabled, s.RaidJoinCount, s.RaidAction, s.RaidPauseInvites = true, 3, securityrepo.ActionKick, false
	refresh(e)
	for i := 0; i < 50; i++ {
		e.OnMemberJoin(ctx, guild, &discordgo.Member{User: &discordgo.User{ID: snowflakeAt(now.AddDate(-1, 0, 0), i)}}) // no avatar
	}
	if n := d.sentCount(); n > 4 {
		t.Errorf("a raid of 50 should produce a handful of alerts, got %d", n)
	}
}

func TestRaidAlertOnlyTouchesNobody(t *testing.T) {
	e, d, st, now := testEngine(t)
	s := st.set(100)
	s.AntiRaidEnabled, s.RaidJoinCount, s.RaidAction, s.RaidPauseInvites = true, 3, securityrepo.ActionAlert, false
	refresh(e)
	for i := 0; i < 5; i++ {
		e.OnMemberJoin(ctx, guild, d.addMember(snowflakeAt(now.AddDate(-1, 0, 0), i)))
	}
	if !e.RaidActive(guild) || len(d.kicked)+len(d.banned) != 0 || len(d.requests) != 0 {
		t.Error("alert-only raid mode must not remove anyone or pause invites")
	}
}

func TestRaidMemoryIsBounded(t *testing.T) {
	e, d, st, now := testEngine(t)
	s := st.set(100)
	s.AntiRaidEnabled, s.RaidJoinCount, s.RaidAction = true, 3, securityrepo.ActionAlert
	refresh(e)
	for i := 0; i < maxRecentJoins+300; i++ {
		e.OnMemberJoin(ctx, guild, &discordgo.Member{User: &discordgo.User{ID: snowflakeAt(now.AddDate(-1, 0, 0), i), Avatar: "a"}})
	}
	r := e.raidFor(guild)
	if len(r.joins) > maxRecentJoins {
		t.Errorf("recent joins not capped: %d", len(r.joins))
	}
	_ = d
}

// ---- Anti-nuke ----

func nukeEngine(t *testing.T) (*Engine, *fakeDiscord, *fakeStore) {
	e, d, st, _ := testEngine(t)
	st.set(100).AntiNukeEnabled = true
	refresh(e)
	d.addMember("50", "200", "202", "204") // a rogue admin with a booster role
	return e, d, st
}

func TestNukeOverTheLimitIsQuarantined(t *testing.T) {
	e, d, st := nukeEngine(t)
	// Limit is 2 channel deletes per 10s.
	e.OnAuditLogEntry(ctx, guild, entry(discordgo.AuditLogActionChannelDelete, "50", "c1"))
	e.OnAuditLogEntry(ctx, guild, entry(discordgo.AuditLogActionChannelDelete, "50", "c2"))
	if _, ok := st.quarantines[key(100, 50)]; ok {
		t.Fatal("two deletes are within the limit")
	}
	e.OnAuditLogEntry(ctx, guild, entry(discordgo.AuditLogActionChannelDelete, "50", "c3"))

	q, ok := st.quarantines[key(100, 50)]
	if !ok || fmt.Sprint(q.PreviousRoleIDs) != "[200 202]" {
		t.Fatalf("roles should be saved (not the managed one): %+v", q)
	}
	if got := strings.Join(d.members["50"].Roles, ","); got != "204" {
		t.Errorf("only the unremovable booster role should remain, got %s", got)
	}
	if d.timeouts["50"] == nil {
		t.Error("the nuker should be timed out")
	}
	sends := d.channelSends()
	last := sends[len(sends)-1]
	if !strings.Contains(last.Embeds[0].Title, "Nuke attempt stopped") || !contains(last.AllowedMentions.Users, "1") {
		t.Errorf("the owner should be pinged: %+v", last)
	}

	// The next delete within a minute doesn't trigger a second response.
	before := len(d.sent)
	e.OnAuditLogEntry(ctx, guild, entry(discordgo.AuditLogActionChannelDelete, "50", "c4"))
	if len(d.sent) != before {
		t.Error("one attempt should be answered once")
	}
}

func TestTrustedOwnerAndBotAreExempt(t *testing.T) {
	e, d, st := nukeEngine(t)
	d.addMember("60", "201")
	st.trusted[100] = []securityrepo.Trusted{{TargetID: 50, Kind: "user"}, {TargetID: 201, Kind: "role"}}
	refresh(e)
	for _, who := range []string{"50", "60", "1", "999"} {
		for i := 0; i < 5; i++ {
			e.OnAuditLogEntry(ctx, guild, entry(discordgo.AuditLogActionMemberBanAdd, who, "x"))
		}
	}
	if len(st.quarantines) != 0 {
		t.Errorf("trusted users, trusted roles, the owner and the bot are exempt: %v", st.quarantines)
	}
}

func TestInstantTriggers(t *testing.T) {
	for name, ent := range map[string]*discordgo.AuditLogEntry{
		"prune":   entry(discordgo.AuditLogActionMemberPrune, "50", ""),
		"vanity":  entry(discordgo.AuditLogActionGuildUpdate, "50", guild, change("vanity_url_code", "old", "scam")),
		"perms":   entry(discordgo.AuditLogActionRoleUpdate, "50", "202", change("permissions", "0", fmt.Sprint(discordgo.PermissionAdministrator))),
		"grant":   entry(discordgo.AuditLogActionMemberRoleUpdate, "50", "70", change("$add", nil, []any{map[string]any{"id": "200"}})),
		"newrole": entry(discordgo.AuditLogActionRoleCreate, "50", "x", change("permissions", nil, fmt.Sprint(discordgo.PermissionManageRoles))),
		"botrole": entry(discordgo.AuditLogActionRoleUpdate, "50", "299", change("name", "Velox", "x")),
	} {
		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
			e, d, st := nukeEngine(t)
			d.addMember("70")
			e.OnAuditLogEntry(ctx, guild, ent)
			if _, ok := st.quarantines[key(100, 50)]; !ok {
				t.Errorf("%s should quarantine at once", name)
			}
		})
	}
}

func TestHarmlessChangesAreIgnored(t *testing.T) {
	e, d, st := nukeEngine(t)
	d.addMember("70")
	// Renaming a role, removing permissions, giving a plain role.
	e.OnAuditLogEntry(ctx, guild, entry(discordgo.AuditLogActionRoleUpdate, "50", "202", change("permissions", fmt.Sprint(discordgo.PermissionAdministrator), "0")))
	e.OnAuditLogEntry(ctx, guild, entry(discordgo.AuditLogActionMemberRoleUpdate, "50", "70", change("$add", nil, []any{map[string]any{"id": "202"}})))
	e.OnAuditLogEntry(ctx, guild, entry(discordgo.AuditLogActionChannelUpdate, "50", "c"))
	if len(st.quarantines) != 0 {
		t.Error("harmless changes must not trigger anything")
	}
}

func TestHarmlessEntriesCostNoLookups(t *testing.T) {
	e, d, _ := nukeEngine(t)
	d.lookups = 0
	e.OnAuditLogEntry(ctx, guild, entry(discordgo.AuditLogActionMessageDelete, "50", "x"))
	e.OnAuditLogEntry(ctx, guild, entry(discordgo.AuditLogActionMemberUpdate, "50", "x"))
	e.OnAuditLogEntry(ctx, guild, entry(discordgo.AuditLogActionMemberRoleUpdate, "50", "70", change("$remove", nil, []any{map[string]any{"id": "202"}})))
	e.OnAuditLogEntry(ctx, guild, entry(discordgo.AuditLogActionGuildUpdate, "50", guild, change("name", "a", "b")))
	if d.lookups != 0 {
		t.Errorf("harmless entries made %d Discord lookups", d.lookups)
	}
}

func TestSelfGrantedTrustedRoleIsNotABypass(t *testing.T) {
	e, d, st := nukeEngine(t)
	st.trusted[100] = []securityrepo.Trusted{{TargetID: 201, Kind: "role"}}
	refresh(e)
	// The rogue admin gives themselves the trusted role...
	d.members["50"].Roles = append(d.members["50"].Roles, "201")
	e.OnAuditLogEntry(ctx, guild, entry(discordgo.AuditLogActionMemberRoleUpdate, "50", "50", change("$add", nil, []any{map[string]any{"id": "201"}})))
	if _, ok := st.quarantines[key(100, 50)]; !ok {
		t.Fatal("granting yourself a trusted role must be stopped, not count as trust")
	}
	if contains(d.members["50"].Roles, "201") {
		t.Error("the trusted role should be gone")
	}
}

func TestTrustedRoleGrantedToAnAltIsTakenBack(t *testing.T) {
	e, d, st := nukeEngine(t)
	st.trusted[100] = []securityrepo.Trusted{{TargetID: 201, Kind: "role"}}
	refresh(e)
	d.addMember("71", "201")
	e.OnAuditLogEntry(ctx, guild, entry(discordgo.AuditLogActionMemberRoleUpdate, "50", "71", change("$add", nil, []any{map[string]any{"id": "201"}})))
	if _, ok := st.quarantines[key(100, 50)]; !ok {
		t.Error("the granter should be quarantined")
	}
	if contains(d.members["71"].Roles, "201") {
		t.Error("the alt should lose the trusted role")
	}
}

func TestNukingBotIsKicked(t *testing.T) {
	e, d, _ := nukeEngine(t)
	d.members["80"] = &discordgo.Member{User: &discordgo.User{ID: "80", Bot: true}}
	e.OnAuditLogEntry(ctx, guild, entry(discordgo.AuditLogActionMemberPrune, "80", ""))
	if !contains(d.kicked, "80") {
		t.Error("a nuking bot should be kicked")
	}
}

func TestAntiNukeOffDoesNothing(t *testing.T) {
	e, _, st := nukeEngine(t)
	st.set(100).AntiNukeEnabled = false
	refresh(e)
	e.OnAuditLogEntry(ctx, guild, entry(discordgo.AuditLogActionMemberPrune, "50", ""))
	if len(st.quarantines) != 0 {
		t.Error("anti-nuke off must not act")
	}
}

func TestUnauthorizedBotAdd(t *testing.T) {
	e, d, st, _ := testEngine(t)
	st.set(100).JoinGateEnabled = true
	refresh(e)
	d.addMember("50", "200")
	e.OnAuditLogEntry(ctx, guild, entry(discordgo.AuditLogActionBotAdd, "50", "81"))
	if !contains(d.kicked, "81") {
		t.Error("a bot added by someone untrusted should be kicked")
	}
	e.OnAuditLogEntry(ctx, guild, entry(discordgo.AuditLogActionBotAdd, "1", "82"))
	if contains(d.kicked, "82") {
		t.Error("the owner may add bots")
	}
}

func TestDangerousQuarantineRoleIsNotAssigned(t *testing.T) {
	e, d, st := nukeEngine(t)
	st.set(100).QuarantineRoleID = 200 // misconfigured: the Admin role
	refresh(e)
	e.OnAuditLogEntry(ctx, guild, entry(discordgo.AuditLogActionMemberPrune, "50", ""))
	if contains(d.members["50"].Roles, "200") {
		t.Error("a quarantine role with dangerous permissions must never be assigned")
	}

	st.set(100).QuarantineRoleID = 203
	refresh(e)
	d.addMember("51", "201")
	e.OnAuditLogEntry(ctx, guild, entry(discordgo.AuditLogActionMemberPrune, "51", ""))
	if !contains(d.members["51"].Roles, "203") {
		t.Error("a safe quarantine role should be assigned")
	}
}

func TestQuarantineRoleVeloxCantAssignDoesNotBlockQuarantine(t *testing.T) {
	e, d, st := nukeEngine(t)
	st.set(100).QuarantineRoleID = 203
	refresh(e)
	d.rejectRole = "203" // e.g. moved above Velox's role after it was configured
	e.OnAuditLogEntry(ctx, guild, entry(discordgo.AuditLogActionMemberPrune, "50", ""))
	if got := strings.Join(d.members["50"].Roles, ","); got != "204" {
		t.Errorf("roles must still be removed without the quarantine role, got %s", got)
	}
	if d.timeouts["50"] == nil {
		t.Error("and the member still timed out")
	}
}

func TestReleaseGivesRolesBack(t *testing.T) {
	e, d, st := nukeEngine(t)
	st.set(100).QuarantineRoleID = 203
	refresh(e)
	e.OnAuditLogEntry(ctx, guild, entry(discordgo.AuditLogActionMemberPrune, "50", ""))

	// The Mod role was deleted meanwhile... no wait, Member (202) was.
	d.roles = append(d.roles[:3], d.roles[4:]...)
	if err := e.Release(ctx, guild, "50", "1"); err != nil {
		t.Fatal(err)
	}
	got := strings.Join(d.members["50"].Roles, ",")
	if got != "204,200" {
		t.Errorf("roles after release = %s (want the booster role kept, Admin back, deleted Member skipped, quarantine role gone)", got)
	}
	if d.timeouts["50"] != nil {
		t.Error("the timeout should be removed")
	}
	if _, ok := st.quarantines[key(100, 50)]; ok {
		t.Error("the quarantine record should be gone")
	}
	if err := e.Release(ctx, guild, "50", "1"); err == nil {
		t.Error("releasing twice should fail")
	}
}

// ---- Lockdown ----

func TestLockAndUnlockRestoreExactly(t *testing.T) {
	e, d, _, _ := testEngine(t)
	d.channels["300"] = &discordgo.Channel{ID: "300", GuildID: guild, Type: discordgo.ChannelTypeGuildText,
		PermissionOverwrites: []*discordgo.PermissionOverwrite{{ID: guild, Type: discordgo.PermissionOverwriteTypeRole,
			Allow: discordgo.PermissionAddReactions, Deny: discordgo.PermissionAttachFiles}}}
	d.channels["301"] = &discordgo.Channel{ID: "301", GuildID: guild, Type: discordgo.ChannelTypeGuildText}
	d.channels["302"] = &discordgo.Channel{ID: "302", GuildID: guild, Type: discordgo.ChannelTypeGuildCategory}
	d.channels["400"] = &discordgo.Channel{ID: "400", GuildID: "other", Type: discordgo.ChannelTypeGuildText}

	if err := e.LockChannel(ctx, guild, "400", "1", false); err == nil {
		t.Fatal("a channel of another server must never be touched")
	}

	locked, failed, err := e.LockServer(ctx, guild, "1")
	if err != nil || locked != 2 || failed != 0 {
		t.Fatalf("locked=%d failed=%d err=%v (categories are skipped)", locked, failed, err)
	}
	o := d.channels["300"].PermissionOverwrites[0]
	if o.Deny&discordgo.PermissionSendMessages == 0 || o.Allow&discordgo.PermissionAddReactions != 0 || o.Deny&discordgo.PermissionAttachFiles == 0 {
		t.Errorf("lock should deny chat and keep other bits: %+v", o)
	}
	// Someone changes an unrelated bit during the lockdown; it must survive.
	o.Allow |= discordgo.PermissionEmbedLinks
	// Locking again must not overwrite the saved "before" state.
	_ = e.LockChannel(ctx, guild, "300", "1", false)

	if _, _, err := e.UnlockServer(ctx, guild, "1"); err != nil {
		t.Fatal(err)
	}
	o = d.channels["300"].PermissionOverwrites[0]
	if o.Allow != discordgo.PermissionAddReactions|discordgo.PermissionEmbedLinks || o.Deny != discordgo.PermissionAttachFiles {
		t.Errorf("unlock should restore the original lock bits and keep the new one: allow=%d deny=%d", o.Allow, o.Deny)
	}
	if len(d.channels["301"].PermissionOverwrites) != 0 {
		t.Error("a channel that had no overwrite should have none again")
	}
	if _, _, err := e.UnlockServer(ctx, guild, "1"); err == nil {
		t.Error("unlocking an unlocked server should say so")
	}
}

// ---- Configuration rules ----

func TestConfigurationPermissions(t *testing.T) {
	e, d, st, _ := testEngine(t)
	admin := d.addMember("50", "200")
	owner := d.members["1"]
	trustedUser := d.addMember("60")
	st.trusted[100] = []securityrepo.Trusted{{TargetID: 60, Kind: "user"}}
	refresh(e)

	// Turning on: Manage Server is enough. Turning off: owner or trusted only.
	if err := e.SetFeature(ctx, guild, admin, discordgo.PermissionManageGuild, securityrepo.FeatureAntiNuke, true); err != nil {
		t.Errorf("an admin may turn anti-nuke on: %v", err)
	}
	if err := e.SetFeature(ctx, guild, admin, discordgo.PermissionAdministrator, securityrepo.FeatureAntiNuke, false); !errors.Is(err, ErrNotTrusted) {
		t.Errorf("an untrusted admin must not turn anti-nuke off: %v", err)
	}
	if err := e.SetFeature(ctx, guild, trustedUser, 0, securityrepo.FeatureAntiNuke, false); err != nil {
		t.Errorf("a trusted user may: %v", err)
	}
	if err := e.SetFeature(ctx, guild, d.addMember("61"), 0, securityrepo.FeatureJoinGate, true); err == nil {
		t.Error("a regular member must not turn things on")
	}
	if err := e.SetFeature(ctx, guild, nil, discordgo.PermissionAdministrator, securityrepo.FeatureJoinGate, true); err == nil {
		t.Error("no actor, no change")
	}

	// Alerts: trusted only, never @everyone, only this server's channels.
	d.channels["500"] = &discordgo.Channel{ID: "500", GuildID: guild, Type: discordgo.ChannelTypeGuildText}
	d.channels["501"] = &discordgo.Channel{ID: "501", GuildID: "other", Type: discordgo.ChannelTypeGuildText}
	if err := e.SetAlerts(ctx, guild, admin, "500", "201"); !errors.Is(err, ErrNotTrusted) {
		t.Errorf("untrusted alert change: %v", err)
	}
	if err := e.SetAlerts(ctx, guild, owner, "500", guild); err == nil {
		t.Error("alerts must never ping @everyone")
	}
	if err := e.SetAlerts(ctx, guild, owner, "501", ""); err == nil {
		t.Error("another server's channel must be refused")
	}
	if err := e.SetAlerts(ctx, guild, owner, "500", "201"); err != nil {
		t.Error(err)
	}

	// Quarantine role: safe roles below Velox only.
	for role, ok := range map[string]bool{"200": false, guild: false, "204": false, "299": false, "203": true} {
		err := e.SetQuarantineRole(ctx, guild, owner, role)
		if (err == nil) != ok {
			t.Errorf("quarantine role %s: err=%v", role, err)
		}
	}

	// Trust: owner only, never @everyone, bounded.
	if err := e.Trust(ctx, guild, trustedUser, "user", "50"); !errors.Is(err, ErrNotOwner) {
		t.Errorf("trusted users must not spread trust: %v", err)
	}
	if err := e.Trust(ctx, guild, owner, "role", guild); err == nil {
		t.Error("trusting @everyone must be refused")
	}
	if err := e.Trust(ctx, guild, owner, "user", "404"); err == nil {
		t.Error("trusting someone not in the server must be refused")
	}
	if err := e.Trust(ctx, guild, owner, "role", "201"); err != nil {
		t.Error(err)
	}
	if err := e.Untrust(ctx, guild, admin, "201"); !errors.Is(err, ErrNotOwner) {
		t.Errorf("only the owner untrusts: %v", err)
	}
}

func TestDashboardCommands(t *testing.T) {
	e, d, st := nukeEngine(t)
	e.OnAuditLogEntry(ctx, guild, entry(discordgo.AuditLogActionMemberPrune, "50", ""))
	st.cmds = []securityrepo.Command{
		{ID: 1, GuildID: 100, CommandType: "release_quarantine", Payload: []byte(`{"user_id":"50; DROP"}`), RequestedBy: 1},
		{ID: 2, GuildID: 100, CommandType: "release_quarantine", Payload: []byte(`{"user_id":"50"}`), RequestedBy: 1},
		{ID: 3, GuildID: 100, CommandType: "nope", RequestedBy: 1},
	}
	e.ProcessCommands(ctx)
	if _, ok := st.quarantines[key(100, 50)]; ok {
		t.Error("the valid release should have run")
	}
	if len(st.done) != 3 {
		t.Errorf("every command must be marked done: %v", st.done)
	}
	_ = d
}

func TestSafeNameDefusesMentionsAndMarkdown(t *testing.T) {
	got := safeName(&discordgo.User{Username: "x", GlobalName: "@everyone **hi** <@&1> [link](http://a)"})
	if strings.Contains(got, "@everyone") || strings.Contains(got, "<@&") || strings.Contains(got, "**") || strings.Contains(got, "](") {
		t.Errorf("unsafe name rendering: %q", got)
	}
}